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Abstract: For many who thought of Venezuela as a consolidated democracy, the 1992 coup attempts came as
a complete surprise. Those familiar with the deterioration of its democratic regime, in contrast, were more
surprised that the coups did not succeed. This article provides an institution-centered explanation of the
puzzle of why the 1992 coup attempts occurred, why they failed, and why the Venezuelan military has
remained quiescent in the years that followed. Institutions of civilian control created during the post-1958
"Punto Fijo" period, particularly those based on fragmenting the officer corps, prevented the collapse of the
democratic regime in 1992. These same institutions allowed civilians to regain authority over the armed
forces during the Rafael Caldera administration and have ensured the subordination of the armed forces to
elected authorities to the present. It is also argued that the institutional basis for civilian control has been
dismantled during the Fifth Republic, heightening the likelihood of future civil-military conflict and
threatening regime stability.
Many who considered Venezuela a consolidated democracy were caught off guard by the coup attempts in
1992. But those familiar with the deterioration of its democratic regime were more surprised that the coups
failed. After President Carlos Andrés Pérez adopted economic austerity measures in 1989, protests by
workers, students, and retirees became a daily occurrence in Venezuela's major cities (Daniels 1992, 238-40).
Although the economy experienced strong growth in 1990 and 1991, it occurred amidst increasing income
inequality and declining real wages. Legislators, including many from the administration's own political
party, attacked the neoliberal structural-adjustment package because it undermined entrenched party interests.
Within the armed forces, military salaries and benefits declined markedly in real terms (Tarre Briceño 1994,
146-54). Even more infuriating to many officers were rumors and allegations of government corruption and
improprieties. Prior to the coup attempts, the approval rating of President Pérez had sunk to record lows
(Romero 1997). According to most standard theoretical accounts of military intervention in politics
(Zimmerman 1983), a coup d'état in these circumstances should have succeeded.1
Since 1992 no new military rebellions have broken out, even as economic, social, and political conditions
have worsened. The 1990s turned out to be another lost decade for Venezuela, one marked by recession, high
inflation, steady devaluation of the currency, popular unrest, the decay of many government services, and the
near collapse of the financial sector. In the political arena, Venezuelans have witnessed a presidential
impeachment, gridlock during the recent term of Rafael Caldera, and a period of wholesale transformation of
state institutions following the election as president of a former coup leader, Lieutenant Colonel Hugo
Chávez Frías. Despite all this upheaval, the armed forces have remained largely quiescent politically as
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President Chávez has dramatically expanded their role in government administration, economic development,
and internal security.
Recent Venezuelan history presents several linked puzzles. If Venezuela was a consolidated democracy
before 1992, what changes occurred in the regime and its armed forces that created the conditions for the
coup attempts? Or if its democracy had become deconsolidated by 1992, why did the coup attempts fail?
Given worsening conditions since 1992, why has the military not intervened directly in politics again?
Finally, although the military appears to be entirely subordinate to President Chávez now, what are the
implications of expanded military participation in the state and the economy for future regime stability?
The decreasing governability of Venezuelan society lies at the heart of one set of politics-centered
explanations for the crisis of the 1990s. For John Martz, Daniel Levine, and Brian Crisp, the current
instability has arisen from the inability of the traditional party system to integrate effectively alternate
organizations that arose in politics and civil society in response to declining standards of living and
deteriorating government services.2 From this perspective, President Pérez's decision to implement a radical
change in economic policy attacked the consensual basis of democratic politics in Venezuela at a time when
traditional political actors were incapable of crafting new rules of the game and thus generated the crisis that
created the opportunity for a coup d'état in 1992 (Martz 1995; Levine and Crisp 1995). More recent analyses
have elaborated on the dysfunctional aspects of the political system that democratizers established in
Venezuela after 1958, examining the roles played by political parties, social actors, and the strong presidency
in inhibiting economic and political reforms (Coppedge 1994; Crisp 1998). Focusing on the relationship
between the military and the political regime, Felipe Agüero, Winfield Burggraff, and Richard Millett have
correctly argued that the political-military relationship deteriorated during the 1980s and 1990s (Burggraff
and Millett 1995; Agüero 1995). Accounts of Hugo Chávez's 1998 electoral victory and the subsequent
transformation of Venezuela's regime are only beginning to emerge (McCoy 1999). A politics-centered
perspective might explain Chávez's 1998 victory as resulting from the collapse of the traditional party system
and the emergence of radical alternative organizations to cope with decreasing governability.
Another group of explanations has given primacy to the political economy of Venezuela as a rentier state.
From this perspective, the crisis in Venezuela is structural in that overwhelming dependence on income from
oil exports "froze" early political institutions and focused political parties, labor, capital, civil society, and the
armed forces exclusively on gaining access to the state's burgeoning wealth. With the decline of oil rents
during the 1980s and 1990s, it became impossible to satisfy competing political interests, and regime crisis
became inevitable (Karl 1997). Efforts to stave off the decline during the 1980s through government control
of the economy further warped incentives and production, making Pérez's programs of structural adjustment
and economic liberalization particularly difficult for the existing political system to accept (Naim and
Piñango 1989). From this point of view, the failure of the Caldera administration to revitalize Punto Fijo
democracy after 1992 could be attributed to terminal deterioration of state institutions in a rentier state
suffering from low international oil prices.
While both political and economic factors are necessary dimensions of any explanation for the deterioration
of Venezuelan democracy during the 1990s, they are not sufficient. An institutional perspective focused on
civil-military relations is needed to understand why the 1992 coups happened and why military rebellion did
not recur despite deteriorating conditions in the decade that followed. Institutions of civilian control of the
military created during the Punto Fijo period, particularly those created to heighten the internal fragmentation
of the officer corps, prevented the collapse of the democratic regime in 1992. These same institutions allowed
civilians to regain authority over the armed forces during the Caldera administration and have ensured the
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subordination of the armed forces to elected authorities to this day.
This article will first examine the institutional pattern of civilian control established in Venezuela during the
initial period of Punto Fijo democracy. It will also analyze how some of these mechanisms of control,
particularly those based on appeasing professional and personal military interests, deteriorated during the
1980s and created an opportunity for a military rebellion. Next, I will examine the origins and failures of the
two 1992 coup attempts and the efforts by President Caldera to revitalize traditional institutions of control
over the armed forces after 1993. The article will conclude by discussing how civil-military relations have
been transformed under the Chávez administration and the Constitution of 1999.
CHANGE AND CONTINUITY IN CIVILIAN CONTROL OF THE VENEZUELAN ARMED
FORCES, 1973-1989
Samuel Huntington's traditional categories of objective and subjective control are generally not useful for
analyzing civil-military relations in democracies because they overlook the institutional arrangements
required by elected officials to provide democratic control of the activities of the armed forces.3 I am
focusing instead on the institutions and strategies used by democratizers to restrict the jurisdictional
boundaries of military authority over the state and to provide civilians with mechanisms for reviewing and
approving military activities (Trinkunas 1999).
In Venezuela after the transition to democracy, civilians consolidated control of the armed forces based on
institutions that fragmented the officer corps yet satisfied their personal and professional interests. In 1958
political leaders (and some military officers), guided by a strategy of divide and conquer, eliminated
centralized military command structures, particularly the Estado Mayor General, and granted administrative
and operational autonomy to each branch of the military services. The ensuing competition for power and
resources among the army, navy, air force, and Guardia Nacional minimized possibilities for interservice
cooperation. This fragmentation was compounded when each service created a system of independent
training centers, garrisons, and commands that led officers to pursue their careers without much contact with
members of other forces. Democratic governments also responded to the potential threat of military
intervention by creating institutions of appeasement, granting rising budgets for the armed forces,
establishing a strong military social safety net, and deferring to their interests in security affairs.
Under this system of control, any incursion by the armed forces into rebellion or even public policy was
swiftly punished during the first democratic administrations, as Venezuelan presidents zealously preserved
their prerogatives to appoint military leaders, approve senior promotions, and command the armed forces.
The fragmented officer corps and the satisfaction of many of its members with their professional and personal
opportunities combined to inhibit conspiracies and reconcile the armed forces to democratic rule. By 1973 the
armed forces retained a high degree of autonomy in the relatively narrow area of state policy that they
controlled, namely, national defense. Although the armed forces preserved a nominal role in maintaining
public order after the counterinsurgency warfare in the early 1970s ended, this mission was carried out by the
Guardia Nacional, a militarized national police force that was viewed with suspicion by other services,
particularly the army (Trinkunas 1999, 286-97).
Once civilian control became consolidated, Venezuelan elected officials practiced a policy of benign neglect
toward the armed forces during the next two decades. This inattention allowed the armed forces to increase
their autonomy from civilian oversight, professionally and politically. After institutionalizing strategies of
divide and conquer and appeasement, civilian rulers felt confident that the threat of military intervention was
fully contained. After the election of Carlos Andrés Pérez in 1974, civilian presidents cut back considerably
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the amount of attention they dedicated to supervising military affairs. They nonetheless retained the capacity
to decide defense policy on an ad hoc basis, as in the decision to end counterinsurgency operations in 1969
and during a serious border incident with Colombia in 1987.4 In the absence of routine civilian supervision,
however, the armed forces were allowed to develop freely and pursue their own bureaucratic reforms and
defense policies. Several policies adopted to enhance their professional standing and capacity had unintended
consequences that weakened the long-term integrity of the boundaries separating civilian and military
authority.
The Seeds of Dissatisfaction
Beginning in the 1970s, the Venezuelan armed forces experienced a generational break within the military
hierarchy, as educational reforms in the national military academies produced a new generation of highly
trained elite junior officers with a strong sense of leadership, élan, and nationalism.5 Under the army's Plan
Andrés Bello, Venezuela's Academia Militar was transformed into a university-equivalent institution,
graduating its first classes at this level in 1974 (Norden 1998, 158-59).6 The plan was designed to stress
leadership training in the new classes of cadets. The professional aspects of military education were
reemphasized, but the program also aimed to inculcate a mystique of honor, discipline, and self-sacrifice in
this new generation of officers.
The Plan Andrés Bello reinforced nationalist patriotic sentiments among officer cadets after 1974. Some
developed an almost mystical attachment to the teachings of Simón Bolívar, and many shared a populist,
egalitarian, and ultimately utilitarian attitude toward democracy. Given the uncertainties and disorder of the
Venezuelan political process, which seemed to place party concerns ahead of national interests, it is not
surprising that most young officers formed a greater attachment to Venezuela's glorious past than to its
inglorious present (Tarre Briceño 1994, 143-46).
At the same time, the Venezuelan armed forces began to search for a new mission and doctrine to replace the
narrow focus on counterinsurgency that had dominated the institution in the 1960s (Manrique 1996, 64-75).
In adapting national security doctrine to a democratic regime, military educational institutes encouraged a
populist, equity-oriented vision of development that matched well the political discourse of the country
during the oil boom of the 1970s.7 Under the influence of this "soft version" of national security doctrine,
military leaders successfully lobbied the Venezuelan Congress for legal provisions that would legitimize their
participation in national economic affairs by adding development to the traditional missions of defense of
sovereignty and counterinsurgency (Manrique 1996, 159). While new legislation expanded the jurisdictional
boundaries of the Venezuelan military, these desires were frustrated in practice by a political system ensuring
that all military participation in development planning was confined to ritualistic and formal exercises.8
Blocked in their efforts to redefine their mission, the Venezuelan officer corps increasingly lost their
professional focus and began to concentrate instead on internal power struggles for resources, promotions,
and assignments. By the mid-1970s, the center of gravity in civil-military relations had shifted to budgetary
concerns. The dramatic expansion of government revenues in the wake of the first and second oil crises led to
Venezuela's defense budget nearly doubling between 1967 and 1977.
TABLE 1: Comparative Government Expenditures per Soldier in Selected Latin American
Countries, 1972-1981
Year Venezuelan Argentine Brazilian Colombian
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1972 $33,856 $18,188 $8,754 $9,584
1973 31,395 17,721 9,450 9,650
1974 34,139 21,878 8,912 8,659
1975 33,739 26,594 8,153 10,773
1976 32,598 30,522 9,606 7,353
1977 34,730 33,410 8,269 6,031
1978 33,364 36,044 7,774 6,582
1979 26,829 35,020 7,124 9,198
1980 25,627 31,929 7,212 10,574
1981 31,808 33,965 6,746 9,304
Source: U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1984. 
NOTE: All figures adjusted to 1997 constant U.S. dollars.
The relative generosity of defense budgets in Venezuela is reflected in table 1, which compares per soldier
expenditures in Venezuela and regional military peers or rivals. Only Argentina approached Venezuelan
levels of expenditures per soldier, but in the context of considerably higher levels of per capita income.
Venezuelan officers could also seek advanced training in the United States and Europe, experience that made
them aware of their relatively privileged status by world standards.9 When health, recreation, and housing
benefits are included, it becomes evident that Venezuelan military officers were among the best compensated
in the Western Hemisphere, enjoying a quality of life second only to that of U.S. and Canadian officers in this
period (Bigler 1981, 102-5, 117-19).
Not all of the government spending went to salaries and benefits, however. Venezuela also rearmed during
this period to improve its external defense capabilities. An unintended consequence of rearmament and the oil
boom in general was growing corruption and malfeasance among senior military officers and civilian
politicians. Equipment was bought with little attention to its compatibility with the existing arsenal or
suitability for use in a Venezuelan context. High-level government officials, military procurement officers,
and well-placed civilian intermediaries all enriched themselves with overpriced defense purchases and
suspiciously large commissions.10 The concern generated by these practices among officers, particularly at
the junior level, became an ongoing source of tension within the armed forces and deepened divisions
between senior officers and new generations of idealistic junior officers.11
Military autonomy, already strong in the absence of civilian interest in security issues, shielded growing
corruption from public scrutiny. The situation was compounded by legal provisions that protected military
budgets and operations from civilian supervision. The Congress approved overall defense expenditures by the
four services but provided no oversight of how money was spent, nor did the legislative branch participate in
preparing detailed military budgets. No member of the defense committees of the Senate or the Chamber of
Deputies had any experience in military affairs (Norden 1998, 151). Rather than falling under the oversight of
a civilian inspector general or the Congress, the armed forces had their own auditor, who reported directly to
the president. Sometimes, even the defense minister did not know how his own service chiefs were spending
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their budgets. Secrecy laws prevented the publication of detailed defense expenditures or a thorough
discussion of defense policies in the media. Behind the shield of military secrecy, congressional or
journalistic investigation of corruption scandals was discouraged, and the armed forces urged the prosecution
of journalists who overstepped these boundaries (Agüero 1995, 150-51).
Although military autonomy excluded civil society from defense matters, politicians found institutional
means to circumvent this barrier. The Constitution of 1961 had established the need for congressional and
presidential approval for any promotion at the rank of colonel or general (and their equivalents in the navy).
This requirement created opportunities for political manipulation, particularly by the president. While only a
small number of promotions were affected, many senior officers felt the need to align themselves informally
with one of the two main political parties, Acción Democrática (AD) and COPEI, to protect their careers.12
Luis Herrera Campíns, president from 1979 to 1983, confirmed this practice in commenting that generals
should be appointed on the basis of trust rather than merit.13 Moreover, a thirty-year limit on military careers
and a policy of yearly rotations of officers among different positions and commands created fierce
competition over choice assignments that well-connected officers could resolve in their favor (Agüero 1993,
199).14 This combination also created a mechanism by which senior military officers practiced self-regulation
to avoid offending civilian politicians, providing the government with a means of controlling the armed
forces at little cost in resources and civilian expertise.
The politicization of promotions and assignments particularly galled junior officers, who were held to strict
ethical and professional standards during their careers. In Venezuela career assignments are made on a
competitive basis at lower ranks, mainly on the educational achievements of individual officers.15 The
conduct of young officers and their ethical handling of professional and personal duties also weigh heavily.
For officers recently graduated from the Academia Militar and strongly indoctrinated in professional
standards, promotion on the basis of political preference instead of merit led them lose respect for both their
military superiors and civilian politicians. Thus politicizing the process of military promotion allowed
civilians to overcome institutional autonomy on important issues but also increasingly split the civilian and
military elite from the junior officer corps (Agüero 1995, 149).
By the 1980s, civil-military relations had settled into a stable if somewhat dysfunctional pattern in Venezuela.
As long as institutions designed to appease and fragment the officer corps were in place, open discontent in
the military was avoided, and the armed forces' substantive authority over state policy was confined to a
narrow range of issues related to defense and policy on borders. Nevertheless, confusion over the military's
mission, civilian inattention to defense issues, growing civilian and military corruption, and politicization of
the armed forces created the potential for a break between the armed forces and the civilian regime. The high
degree of military autonomy from civilian oversight also meant that the growing alienation of many officers
went undetected by the civilian government. Politicians had become complacent, confident that they could
rely on their connections with the military high command to maintain supervision over the armed forces. The
growing distance between the generals and admirals and their subordinates consequently undermined the
ability of politicians to detect military unrest. Thus when anti-government military conspiracies finally began
to develop after 1983, the government was caught mostly off guard.
IMMEDIATE CAUSES OF RENEWED MILITARY INTERVENTION IN POLITICS
The coup attempts of 1992 caught most Venezuelans by surprise because after three decades of civilian rule,
military intervention had become unthinkable. Despite rising civilian unrest and broad political opposition to
the structural-adjustment program implemented by President Pérez, no observers seriously believed that
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political and economic crisis in Venezuela would be resolved through military means. Yet this same crisis in
the Venezuelan model of development undermined important institutions of civilian control over the armed
forces, particularly those concerned with appeasing the armed forces. The highly autonomous status of the
armed forces facilitated the emergence of peculiar factions among junior officers who vehemently opposed
the Venezuelan political system. Moreover, the economic, defense, and foreign policies of the Pérez
administration had angered many officers and predisposed them to join the new anti-government factions in
the armed forces. Although senior officers continued to support the regime firmly, they had become so
enmeshed in the internal politics of budgets, promotions, assignments, and corruption that they had lost touch
with the rest of the officer corps. In this environment, a small group of conspirators could organize a coup
d'état relatively unchecked.
Setting the Stage: Economic Austerity and the Breakdown of Consensual Politics in Venezuela
When the international price of oil began its steady decline in 1982, the Venezuelan political economy, which
was based on maintaining democratic political stability through state redistribution of oil revenues, became
unsustainable (McCoy and Smith 1995, 124-25). The plunge in international oil prices that began in 1982
deprived the government of revenues to finance this profligate political model, yet Venezuelan elites were
unwilling to take the painful steps needed to remedy the crisis. The foreign debt climbed past 33 billion
dollars, over 80 percent of which was owed by the state. In the meantime, inequality between rich and poor
widened rapidly, erasing many of the gains made during the 1970s as the number of Venezuelans living in
critical poverty expanded from 32.6 percent at the beginning of the 1980s to 53.7 percent in 1989 (Karl
1997).
Faced with an acute balance of payments crisis and the accelerating collapse of state institutions, newly
elected President Pérez adopted a radical structural-adjustment plan called "El Gran Viraje" (the Great
Turnabout). This adjustment involved simultaneously eliminating price and currency controls, raising interest
rates, reducing tariffs, and beginning to privatize state industries and deregulate the economy. The result was
that in 1989 alone, the rate of inflation surged to 80 percent, the gross domestic product declined by 10
percent, and personal income dropped by 14 percent (Naim 1993, 59-60).
The results of the Gran Viraje shocked Venezuelans, cushioned by years of populist policies from the harsh
economic reality facing the country. Even though the low point of 1989 was followed by two years of strong
economic growth, Pérez's policies led to widespread political discontent among manufacturers, labor unions,
government employees, political activists, and the middle and lower classes. Furthermore, the public was
infuriated by the perception that government corruption was continuing unabated while ordinary Venezuelans
were suffering the effects of a draconian economic policy. Targeted social benefits failed to reach the poor in
a timely fashion, and existing social services collapsed, exacerbating the impact of the adjustment policy on
those least able to afford it (Naim 1993, 80-93).
The rise in opposition in the legislature and the public at large fomented a growing sense of political crisis in
the Pérez administration. Even the president's own party, Acción Democrática, turned against him. In national
opinion polls taken at the end of 1991, President Pérez and Acción Democrática registered 12.3 percent
approval ratings, the lowest ever recorded in Venezuela (Burggraff and Millett 1995, 69). Rising levels of
public animosity toward the government and its policies thus undermined the consensual underpinnings of
Venezuelan democracy and degraded the legitimacy of the Pérez administration, even as the armed forces
were increasingly called on to sustain the government against popular protests.
Breaking Down Institutionalized Appeasement of the Armed Forces
2/7/14, 9:32 AM
Page 8 of 29http://lasa-2.univ.pitt.edu/LARR/prot/search/retrieve/?Vol=37&Num=1&Start=41
An unintended consequence of President Pérez's economic austerity policies was to draw the Venezuelan
military into internal security functions, a leading indicator of civil-military conflict (Trinkunas 1999, 12-16).
In the first weeks of his administration, a popular uprising in Caracas on 27 February 1989 was repressed by
the armed forces at the cost of several hundred civilian casualties. Public protests escalated rapidly in late
1991 and early 1992, exceeding nine hundred major events over a period of seven months. Senior military
commanders were mainly concerned that the rising tide of lawlessness would destabilize the political system.
But the deployment of the armed forces to repress the February 1989 uprising had disgusted many junior
officers, especially on contrasting the poverty of the rioters with the alleged corruption of politicians and the
military high command. The military's participation in these events highlighted the power and efficacy of the
armed forces in the public mind and increased the civilian government's reliance on the military for internal
security, but it undermined junior officers' confidence in their superiors (Burggraff and Millett 1995, 60-61).
Structural-adjustment measures enacted by President Pérez also exacerbated the steady decline in living
standards for many military officers, thus undermining a fundamental institution for appeasing the officer
corps. The wages and benefits of officers, like those of most Venezuelans, failed to keep up with the inflation
of 1989-1990, which topped out at over 100 percent. The armed forces budget had peaked in 1982 at $1.15
billion and then declined steadily during the 1980s, even as the number of soldiers in the Venezuelan armed
forces grew from fifty-five thousand to seventy-five thousand over the same period (U.S. ACDA 1996). The
large apparent decline shown beginning in table 1 can be explained in part by the steep devaluation of the
Venezuelan currency after 1983. One measure of this trend is that spending declined from more than thirty-
one thousand dollars per soldier in 1982 to less than fifteen thousand in 1991. A significant proportion of the
defense budget was needed to sustain purchases of material and spare parts from abroad, particularly after a
war scare with Colombia in 1987, a requirement that further reduced the proportion of the military budget
spent on salaries and benefits. Moreover, because officers were government employees, their salaries were
even slower to adjust to the new economic realities than those of private-sector employees, causing an
extended period of relative economic deprivation (Naim 1993, 117-18).
Suddenly, officers who had been comfortably upper-middle-class found themselves barely able to maintain
lower-middle and working-class living standards. Even junior officers had been able to afford housing, new
cars, and vacations, but now their families had to share cramped apartments in poor neighborhoods. These
disparities affected junior officers (lieutenants and captains) the most, and more and more abandoned their
military careers for employment in the private sector. The abrupt decline in living standards in less than a
decade deepened military discontent with democratic rule (Burggraff and Millett 1995, 62).
In this context, corruption in military procurement involving civilian politicians and senior military officers
infuriated many younger officers. Some cases of military corruption were linked to President Pérez's civilian
security chief, Orlando García (Capriles Ayala 1992, 677). Allegations of corruption were also made by firms
that had lost bids to provide services to the armed forces and hoped to use public outrage to force
reexamination of the contract awards process.16 Allegations of corruption received wide media coverage
during this period, an unusual experience for the armed forces.17 The failure to resolve many of these cases
satisfactorily reinforced suspicions among the public and the officer corps of the incompetence and
dishonesty of senior military and political figures (Tarre Briceño 1994, 147-54).
President Pérez was also criticized by some junior officers for his handling of external defense issues. His
privatization policies, which led to the sale of state industries and the national telecommunications company
to foreign investors, were viewed as damaging to national sovereignty by many officers still influenced by a
belief system that equated security with state control of "strategic industrial sectors." Within the armed
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forces, many reacted negatively to the president's increased reliance on the Venezuelan military to support his
foreign policy ventures. A battalion of Venezuelan troops participated in peacekeeping in Nicaragua in 1989-
1990, and Venezuelan officers served as observers with the United Nations on the Iraq-Kuwait border. But
some officers who remained behind accused the government of using Venezuelan troops as mercenaries.18
Rounding out this picture of discontent was military outrage over comments by President Pérez
acknowledging that Colombia might have some rights in disputed maritime territory in the Gulf of Venezuela
(Burggraff and Millett 1995, 63).19
By early 1992, expansion of military participation in internal security missions and weakening of the
institutions of appeasement of the officer corps had created the necessary preconditions for a coup d'état. In
reaction to the policies of President Pérez, junior officers began to question the legitimacy of the Pérez
administration as well as the fitness of their own senior officers to lead them. Their elite orientation also
convinced many junior officers that they had both the duty and the ability to change the country's political
course. This conviction led some junior officers to organize and prepare for a coup d'état.
Origins of the Movimiento Bolivariano Revolucionario 200
As noted, civilian leaders had institutionalized mechanisms to divide and conquer the armed forces following
the 1958 transition to democracy. These institutions created cleavages that crosscut the officer corps. While
these mechanisms made coups d'état difficult, they also had the perverse consequence of distancing junior
and senior officers and inhibiting the ability of the military high command to manage internal discontent.
During the 1970s and 1980s, groups of mid-ranking and junior officers had begun to form factions or self-
help groups that shared common interests and mutually assisted each other in competing for assignments and
promotions (Müller Rojas 1992, 70-71). One such group, the Movimiento Bolivariano Revolucionario 200
(MBR-200),20 eventually took advantage of the declining political fortunes of the Pérez administration to
lead an attempted coup.
The MBR-200 was formed in 1983 by junior army officers who were among the first graduates of the
reformed university-level Academia Militar. They developed a strongly populist and nationalist belief system
based on their selective reading of the ideas of Simón Bolívar and other early Venezuelan participants in the
wars of independence. They were also influenced by their contacts with Venezuelan Marxist guerrillas who
had been defeated in the 1960s (Gott 2000, 37-40). Members of the MBR-200 particularly opposed political
corruption, neoliberal economic policies, and foreign influences, and they advocated a strong Bolivarian
democracy (Tarre Briceño 1994, 177-83). They also criticized internal politicization of the armed forces, the
participation of officers in nonmilitary duties like rural vaccination campaigns, and overseas missions under
UN command (Agüero 1995, 141, 150). Members of the MBR-200 viewed themselves as better soldiers than
their commanders, contrasting their own university-level professional education with the hasty training their
commanders had received in the 1960s (Norden 1998, 160-61).
Lieutenant Colonel Chávez and his coconspirators began working as early as 1982 toward a revolutionary
coup to transform Venezuela into "a true democracy." Members of the MBR-200 believed that civilian
politicians had long ceased to act according to the constitution, particularly in failing to provide justice,
equity, and development. This belief justified a coup "to restore democracy." Several members served as
instructors at the Academia Militar during the early 1980s, and their students' graduation extended the reach
of the MBR-200 into many major army garrisons.21
The MBR-200 did not go undetected by either senior officers or the Ministerio de la Defensa's Dirección de
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Inteligencia Militar (DIM). In 1984 an army investigation uncovered the role of Chávez and others in
promoting anti-regime ideas and actions at the academy, and these officers were quickly transferred to other
assignments. Yet they were not dismissed from the armed forces and continued to rise through the ranks and
proselytize among their fellow officers. A handful of senior officers, including Generals Carlos Peñaloza and
Pedro Rangel Rojas, commanders of the army in 1989 and 1992 respectively, tracked the activities of the
MBR-200. They brought the matter to the attention of President Pérez, but he dismissed the group as a
serious threat (Tarre Briceño 1994, 174-76).22 Similarly, civilian intelligence organizations that monitored
military activities, particularly the DISIP (the División de Servicios de Investigación y Protección, the
national political police), were rendered ineffective after 1989 by a politically driven reorganization.23 This
singular lack of attention to dissent in the officer corps continued through the next three years.
At the same time, the senior ranks of the army had lost some cohesion after splitting over the appointment of
General Fernando Ochoa Antich as Minister of Defense in 1991. He had graduated forty-third in his class at
the academy, and his selection over General Santiago Ramírez, who had been first in his class, unleashed
internal maneuvering among generals and mutual accusations of corruption, malfeasance, and
politicization.24 These accusations received increasing press coverage as generals used friends in the press to
publicize their allegations against their opponents. The publicity further damaged the image of senior officers
among the other officers and also reduced the level of attention focused on the MBR-200 (Daniels 1992,
180).
By February 1992, the lieutenant colonels who led the MBR-200 had been appointed to key troop commands
in Venezuela's five major cities, including an elite airborne battalion controlled by Chávez. Membership of
the MBR-200 reportedly totaled 10 percent of all army officers. The MBR-200 was thus well positioned to
attempt a coup in 1992, given the level of public opposition to the government and the ongoing
disorganization of civilian and military elites (Tarre Briceño 1994). Superior officers were distracted by
political infighting, and the MBR-200 expected wide support among junior officers alienated from the high
command and the Pérez administration. With these advantages, it seemed likely to the MBR-200 leaders that
the coup attempt would succeed.
THE FAILURE OF THE 1992 COUP ATTEMPTS AND ITS IMPACT ON THE MILITARY
Chance played a significant role in the failure of the 4 February coup attempt. The director of the Academia
Militar uncovered the coup plot among his cadets on 3 February and informed the high command, allowing
General Ochoa Antich to take preliminary defensive measures. Rebels initially planned to seize the president
as he returned from Davos, Switzerland, to the Generalísimo Francisco Miranda Air Base in Caracas. When
his plane delayed in taking off from New York, it was diverted to the civilian international airport to prevent a
night landing in Caracas, thus disrupting rebel plans. The MBR-200 attempted instead to seize Carlos Andrés
Pérez when he was returning to the presidential residence at La Casona, but a determined defense by the
president's military escort foiled the rebel paratroopers. The plotters failed to improvise in the wake of these
failures, allowing loyal military commanders to mobilize their forces, surround rebellious troops in Caracas,
and force them to surrender.25
Beyond these initial tactical errors, the failure of this and a second coup attempt in 1992 can be attributed
largely to institutionalized fragmentation within the officer corps. These cleavages prevented military rebels
from assembling an effective "coup coalition." The 4 February coup attempt failed due to lack of
participation in the rebel movement of any units except those in the army. In post-coup interviews and
memoirs, MBR-200 members reported that they sought the cooperation of members from all other military
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services but met with little success (Tarre Briceño 1994, 219-25).
Isolation of the coup plotters from the other services was not necessarily self-imposed but rather a reflection
of the institutionalized policies of divide and conquer that had enforced civilian rule for thirty years. The
administrative independence of each service inhibited the formation of interservice links among junior
officers. The army was considered by its members as the senior service, which led them to minimize the
importance of coordinating a coup with the other armed services (Jiménez Sánchez 1996, 150, 226). In stark
contrast, senior political and military leaders could work jointly during both coup attempts, coordinating loyal
military units from several different services to defeat both 1992 attempts. The unity of the senior military
and political leaders thus allowed them to prevail despite the confusion and uncertainty generated by the coup
attempts.
Even though short-term survival was secured, the Pérez administration never recovered its political or
military footing after the coup attempt on 4 February. This climate of uncertainty created an opening for a
new military rebellion. Mounting civilian criticism of administration policies, continuing economic pressure
on the middle and lower classes, and the inability to sustain a nationally united government isolated Pérez
and his team. Even though no civilian groups were openly pushing for a new coup, calls for Pérez's
resignation, constitutional reform, and an end to economic austerity measures created an atmosphere in which
the collapse of the government seemed a real possibility. Civilian consensus on the legitimacy of the
administration, if not of Venezuelan democracy as a whole, seemed to be crumbling. In the face of Pérez's
unconditional defense of his government and his policies, some military officers concluded that another coup
was not only viable but the only way to meet popular demands (Trinkunas 1999, 316-21).
In the aftermath of the first failed coup, conditions for a more broadly based coup emerged. Even though the
first coup failed, it made military intervention in politics thinkable for many in the officer corps. Junior and
mid-ranking officers became aware of just how widely civilian and military discontent had spread. Whereas
disgust with the political system had once been a private matter for officers, the presence of overt opposition
toward the government on military bases reinforced conspiratorial tendencies among the officer corps
(Daniels 1992, 235-36). The navy and air force also experienced an upsurge in dissent and plotting among its
junior officers, who eagerly followed the example set by the MBR-200. The spread of dissent across all
branches of the military then made it possible for conspirators to identify potential allies in other services.
But in a military regulated by divide and conquer institutions, the spread of military dissent also undermined
the possibility of a successful coup by fragmenting opposition to the regime. Although Chávez and the MBR-
200 enjoyed great prestige for their leading role in the events of 4 February, they could not control the large
number of independent conspiracies that developed during the summer and fall of 1992. Having been
imprisoned in the wake of the first failed coup, Chávez lacked command of troops, hierarchical authority, and
freedom of movement to maintain control of the MBR-200 or incorporate new conspirators into its ranks
(Jiménez Sánchez 1996, 262-63). Confusion over goals, methods, and ideology among dissident officers
contributed to the conspiratorial frenzy of this period and hindered the formation of a coherent anti-
government movement. This situation placed pressure on Chávez to act quickly before his leadership of the
radical opposition to the Pérez administration was challenged by another newly radicalized military faction
eager to overthrow the government.
The fragmented state of the officer corps also contributed to the failure of a second coup attempt on 27
November 1992. This attempt was organized by more senior officers, Admiral Hernán Grüber Odreman and
General Francisco Visconti Osorio, and they represented entirely different services. Miscommunication,
mistrust, and betrayal characterized the behavior of its participants, revealing the conspiracy to senior
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military authorities before it even began (Jiménez Sánchez 1996, 393-94).26 This situation occurred despite
efforts by the military participants to correct "the errors" committed during the 4 February coup attempt. Both
civilian commentators and military officers had argued in the wake of the first rebellion that the MBR-200
had failed to secure the cooperation of senior officers, other military services, or civilian support, thus
allowing the Pérez administration to survive.27 The leaders of the new conspiracy established contact with
civilian politicians and technocrats, other senior officers, the MBR-200 and its civilian allies, and all four
military services (Grüber Odreman 1993, 105-8). But as the organizing and executing of the coup showed, it
was simply too difficult to coordinate among these different groups and sectors.
In the second coup attempt, the air force and navy coup leaders found that they could not depend on their
coconspirators in the army to carry out their plans (Grüber Odreman 1993, 100, 113). This mutual distrust
was exacerbated by the differing political orientations of the two sets of coup plotters, with Chávez's group of
officers representing a considerably more leftist political program than that of Admiral Grüber. Consequently,
important commanders of ground units who had originally agreed to participate in the coup abstained from
the final operations (Jiménez Sánchez 1996, 252-53). A successful coup requires mutual trust and the
coordinated efforts of various unrelated military units that have never worked together before. Lacking
hierarchy or trust, the conspirators of 27 November were unable to coordinate the military units necessary for
the coup to succeed. Only the corps of senior generals and admirals were united in defending the regime, and
they once again coordinated with the civilian administration to suppress military rebellion.
Disaffected officers found conspiracy against the government an attractive idea in the abstract, but actual
participation in a coup was a risky proposition that could lead to loss of their careers or even their lives. In
contrast, betraying the coup to the military high command and civilian authorities was a sure path to greater
rewards. This set of incentives meant that only officers who were ideologically or morally committed to
rebelling against the government participated in these operations. Many other officers and certainly most
senior officers had simply too much of a stake in the military system and the continuation of the civilian
regime to participate in overthrowing the government.
Impact of the 1992 Coups on the Armed Forces and the Government
Even though the regime survived, the 1992 coups proved to be a political disaster for the Pérez
administration. Senior political figures rallied rapidly to defend the civilian regime, yet popular opinion
remained fascinated by the actions of the MBR-200. Opinion polls taken in the wake of the uprising
suggested that while Venezuelans still favored democracy, they were deeply opposed to the policies of the
Pérez administration (Romero 1994, 35). The rebels' positive image was solidified by Chávez's televised
speech following his surrender, in which he accepted responsibility and promised future action against the
government (Tarre Briceño 1994, 125-31). In a televised speech to the Senate, former President Caldera
justified the actions of the MBR-200 as an understandable response to the policies of the Pérez administration
even as he condemned the coup (Hernández 1995, 70). This speech echoed popular sentiment and solidified
public opinion in favor of the rebels and against the government. Meanwhile, groups of academics,
intellectuals, and elder statesmen persisted in calling for an end to neoliberal reforms, new elections, and a
constituent assembly. These statements were widely publicized. Two left-wing opposition parties, the
Movimiento al Socialismo and Causa R, echoed the call for radical political reform, proclaiming it the only
means of saving democracy. The Pérez administration became more isolated than ever, especially after
COPEI withdrew its support from a national unity government that had been formed to defend the regime in
the wake of the first coup attempt (Hernández 1995, 77-80).
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In contrast, the international community, led by the United States, responded quickly and effectively to news
of the coup attempt. U.S. Ambassador Michael Skol and his superiors in Washington announced their support
for democracy and the Pérez administration and threatened drastic sanctions against any military regime that
took power in Venezuela. The U.S. armed forces immediately increased the flow of training missions to
Venezuela, which sent the same message to the junior officer corps.28 Most Venezuelan generals and admirals
did not need much convincing that a coup was a bad idea because their personal and professional interests
made them the firmest military supporters of the Pérez administration. U.S. statements against the MBR-200
angered some more nationalistic officers and civilians, however, who perceived them as evidence of
Venezuela's limited sovereignty, U.S. imperialism, and the anti-national character of the Pérez administration
(Grüber Odreman 1993, 235, 237-38).
On the military front, Pérez reacted quickly, using the strong links between civilian and military elites to
reestablish military order and provide security for his administration. Despite previous differences,
Venezuelan generals and admirals were nearly unanimous in supporting the administration and the regime
because they feared public disorder, the disintegration of the military institution into squabbling factions, and
the threat posed by rebellious junior officers (Daniels 1992, 193).
With the active cooperation of the generals and admirals, President Pérez could rely on traditional military
institutional mechanisms to attack and remove rebellious officers from the armed forces. Because these
efforts were cloaked in appeals to norms, laws, procedures, and respect for hierarchy, many doubtful officers
found it easier to obey orders than vigorously oppose the purge of the MBR-200 from the officer corps. Its
members were rapidly arrested and detained in military prisons, even though only 6 percent of the more than
twenty-six hundred service members participating in the rebellion were indicted in military courts (Daniels
1992, 196). Officers belonging to the MBR-200 were tried in military courts, convicted of treason, and
sentenced to decades of imprisonment. These sentences, however, were later overturned on procedural
grounds by the civilian Corte Suprema de Justicia.29
Pérez intensified civilian and military monitoring of the officer corps, reviving a strategy that had allowed the
first presidents of the democratic period to maintain power during the 1960s. Officers of dubious loyalty were
expelled from the armed forces or sent overseas for lengthy periods as students or military attachés. Officers
allowed to remain in Venezuela were carefully watched and rotated through new commands every three to six
months. Junior officers, once expected to work long hours and remain on base after their superiors had
departed, were sent home promptly at five to reduce the potential for new conspiracies hatching during
unsupervised evening hours. Generals and colonels were assigned to command units once led by lieutenant
colonels and majors, and their unit armories were carefully secured and equipped with alarms, precluding any
junior officers from significant access to weapons or munitions.30
The Direccíon de Inteligencia Militar (DIM) played a leading role in tracking conspiratorial activities in both
the armed forces and civil society. Leftist politicians and activists were targeted by the DIM as well for their
outspoken support for the MBR-200 and opposition to the government.31 President Pérez, senior military
commanders, and members of the intelligence community (many of whom had experienced the
counterinsurgency of the 1960s) all viewed the MBR-200 and its supporters among academic and intellectual
leftists as part of a larger left-wing plot against democracy (Jiménez Sánchez 1996, 155-61, 275-305).
Although these suspicions may have been unfounded, monitoring and vigilance within the army dissuaded
some officers from conspiratorial activities and aborted several plots against President Pérez (Daniels 1992,
197-200).32
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The Pérez administration also reinvigorated the institutions of civilian control designed to appease the armed
forces, investing a large amount of new resources in the military's social safety net. All officers immediately
received 30 percent pay increases, while loyal officers were rewarded by having outstanding debts paid off.
Housing subsidies and allowances also increased substantially (Burggraff and Millett, 67).33 As the U.S.
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency reported, military spending in Venezuela totaled 1.55 billion dollars
in 1992, 50 percent higher than average expenditures from 1988 to 1990, even as spending on arms imports
declined from an average of 233 million dollars during the same period to 80 million in 1992 (U.S. ACDA
1996). This trend suggests that more of the military budget was targeted for personnel and operations than for
new acquisitions, thus improving the lot of the officer corps. All the military personnel and civilian experts
interviewed noted a sharp rise in spending on the social welfare of the armed forces, which was designed to
address a major grievance of the military rebels.
In the end, the 1992 coup attempts sealed the fate of the Pérez administration, even if not immediately.
President Pérez was removed from office on 21 May 1993, not by a military rebellion but by an act of
impeachment by the Venezuelan Senate. This step immediately followed the findings by the Supreme Court
that enough evidence existed to indict Pérez on charges of misuse of government funds to provide security
services for President Violeta Chamorro of Nicaragua. Pérez was replaced by noted Venezuelan historian
Ramón Velásquez, who served out the remainder of the term.
Velásquez inherited a precarious political environment, particularly after he was largely abandoned by his
erstwhile electors in the Venezuelan Senate. The outspoken Minister of Defense, Admiral Radamés Muñoz
León, repeatedly sparked rumors of a coup with his open criticism of leftist political parties, particularly
Causa R. That party hoped to win the forthcoming December 1993 elections and retaliated against the
admiral in the media (Jiménez Sánchez 1996, 417-23).34 Velásquez also faced a slowing economy as foreign
investors lost confidence and the government's commitment to structural adjustment faltered. Public protests
over economic conditions continued, although not as intensely as under the Pérez administration. Velásquez
succeeded nevertheless in delivering power in March 1994 to his successor, Rafael Caldera, who was elected
to serve a nonconsecutive second term as president.
ATTEMPTING TO REBUILD THE STATUS QUO: THE ARMED FORCES DURING THE
CALDERA ADMINISTRATION (1994-1998)
President Caldera took office with the political project of returning Venezuela to the traditions of pacted,
populist democracy inaugurated in 1958.35 Only in the area of civilian control did he manage to carry out his
agenda. By 1994 military participation in politics had expanded dangerously compared with the 1970s and
1980s. General Ochoa Antich used his position as defense minister to influence the formation of a national
unity government in 1992, and Admiral Muñoz León acted similarly in attacking a major party contending in
the 1993 elections, Causa R. Continuing public unrest led the armed forces to emphasize internal security,
much to the distaste of some officers. Throughout these years the Pérez and Velásquez administrations
continued their efforts to contain military rebellion, which included the manipulation of promotions and
assignments of military officers.
Given this picture of increased military and civilian trespassing on each other's traditional jurisdictions in
Venezuela, why were there no successful military revolts after 1992? Certainly, President Caldera's failure to
restore economic prosperity and reduce inequality cannot explain why the military threat receded. In 1993
Caldera's populist platform promised a renewed commitment to social equity, justice, and an end to neoliberal
economic reforms, but his administration achieved only the last of these objectives. One of his first executive
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decrees suspended the constitutional guarantees of citizens, stating that this measure was necessary to
prosecute effectively corrupt politicians and business leaders responsible for the crisis. The administration
also imposed new exchange and price controls in an attempt to halt soaring inflation, a deepening recession,
and capital flight. Soon after, the government halted privatizations and abandoned neoliberal economic
policies. Foreign investment dropped, the stock market plummeted, and the shaky banking system nearly
collapsed. Caldera responded with billions of dollars in bailout funds, which produced soaring inflation due
to excess liquidity in the money supply. Inflation rose from little more than 20 percent under Carlos Andrés
Pérez to 73 percent in 1994, surpassing 100 percent in 1995. After stagnating in 1993, the Venezuelan
economy entered a steep recession in 1994 accompanied by a reduction of 3.3 percent in gross domestic
product (Hernández 1995, 109-12; McCoy and Smith 1995, 139-41). In 1995, 41 percent of Venezuelans
were living in critical poverty (defined as those who can afford less than half the basic level of goods and
services), while 39 percent had fallen into relative poverty (Romero 1997).
Because economic and social factors cannot explain why the military threat receded after 1993, I have sought
an institutional explanation. President Caldera instituted a return to a well-proved model of civilian control
based on institutions of appeasement and divide and conquer as part of his overall attempt to restore Punto
Fijo democracy. Caldera was convinced that the democratic institutions he had helped craft in 1958 would
save Venezuelan democracy in the 1990s.
On taking office, Caldera reestablished himself as the commander in chief of the armed forces by summarily
dismissing Admiral Muñoz León as defense minister several months before his official retirement date. The
president selected a relatively junior army general as his new defense minister, a choice that forced nearly a
dozen more senior generals to resign rather than serve under a junior officer.36 Thus in one stroke, Caldera
reasserted civilian authority over the military high command, purged it of AD-leaning officers, and eased
some resentments of junior officers toward their commanders. Caldera also eliminated a source of discontent
among junior officers by issuing presidential pardons for all soldiers convicted of participating in the 1992
coups on the condition that they retire immediately from the armed forces. Some criticized this move as
sending a terrible signal to future conspirators, but it removed the issue of the continuing imprisonment of the
1992 coup plotters from the public debate, thus depriving MBR-200 supporters on the Left of an opportunity
to attack the government. Moreover, as civilians, Chávez and other former rebels had fewer opportunities to
influence the junior officer corps, and their forced retirement signaled to active-duty military officers that
participation in conspiracies would carry consequences.37 By expelling both the military high command and
the MBR-200, Caldera purged the officer corps of its two most politicized extremes and allowed the rest to
return to their professional duties.
Caldera reemphasized professionalism by ordering the armed forces to suppress the activities of Colombian
insurgents in border areas. Increasing activity by guerrillas in the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de
Colombia (FARC) in Venezuela's frontier regions resulted in numerous attacks on military outposts and
significant casualties between 1994 and 1998. Caldera responded by creating two military theaters of
operations to combat guerrillas along the Colombian frontier and redeploying soldiers from all services to the
region for external and internal security duties. This hard-line stance toward Colombia contrasted sharply
with the policies of former President Pérez.
President Caldera also began to use the military to resolve public-policy crises, deploying soldiers to maintain
emergency services during strikes by public-sector employees. Air traffic controllers at major airports were
replaced by air force counterparts in one instance, and a doctor's strike was countered by militarizing
government hospitals and temporarily replacing the doctors with others from the armed forces. Rather than
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allow Caracas public transportation to be shut down during a strike by Metro (subway) employees, Caldera
ordered the army to keep the trains running.38 This military participation in public service was welcomed
because it resonated with the national security doctrine of "democracy and development" current within the
officer corps.
Meanwhile, Caldera rebuilt institutions for appeasing the officer corps. Military officers received pay raises
that matched inflation in 1994 and exceeded it in 1995, leading the defense minister to declare that members
of the officer corps were receiving the best salaries in history.39 While the defense budget continued to drop
in dollars during the 1990s, most military spending was targeting the social needs of the officer corps.40
Caldera also continued the policy of rotating officers frequently through different commands, appointing a
new defense minister on schedule every year. Outgoing ministers were appointed to senior civilian positions
in the government, including several ministries and ambassadorships, thereby retaining the loyalty of senior
officers. Collectively, these measures of appeasement pacified the officer corps sufficiently and reinforced the
president's image as a concerned commander in chief.
Caldera's statist economic policies and his anti-corruption rhetoric met with approval from the officer corps,
steeped in the idea that state-led development would bring national security. His efforts to direct the economy
through subsidies and price and exchange controls matched the sense of entitlement shared by most
Venezuelans, including the military, as polling data from the period suggests. Even Caldera's decision to
suspend constitutional guarantees for more than a year in the (ineffective) pursuit of corruption was approved
by 62 percent of Venezuelans (Romero 1997). Moreover, the long public-opinion honeymoon of the Caldera
administration (indicated by its approval ratings rising by 30 percent in the first eight months) temporarily
reduced public protest and solidified the legitimacy of the regime (Romero 1997). The president's popular
support and his less conflictive economic policies thus encouraged potential conspirators in the armed forces
to refrain from new plots.
When Caldera's efforts to reinvigorate the post-1958 model eventually failed, the government's position vis-à-
vis the armed forces paradoxically became more secure rather than shakier. The return to a state-centered
economy worsened the material conditions of most Venezuelans after 1995, and public approval ratings for
President Caldera fell rapidly. Anti-government protests and strikes again became the norm. Yet no new signs
of military discontent appeared as they had under Carlos Andrés Pérez. Many in the armed forces,
particularly in the high command, saw no policy alternatives to those presented by the government. This
conclusion ensured that the military remained quiescent during this period of deteriorating conditions.
IMPACT OF THE ELECTION OF PRESIDENT CHAVEZ ON THE VENEZUELAN ARMED
FORCES
On 6 December 1998, former coup leader Hugo Chávez was elected president of Venezuela by 56 percent of
the voters. His victory culminated a year of unprecedented change in the Venezuelan political environment.
Chávez's electoral fortunes had risen from near invisibility in the polls in December 1997 to a consistent lead
nine months later. The dominant traditional parties, COPEI and the AD, polled in the single digits in this
presidential election, after capturing over 90 percent of the votes only a decade earlier. This rapid shift in
voter preferences and party loyalty is highly unusual and signals the depth of crisis experienced by
Venezuelans during the 1990s. Chávez's political campaign resonated with voters because it called for radical
change. The centerpiece of his agenda was to convene a constituent assembly to rewrite the Constitution of
1961 (McCoy and Trinkunas 1999). In the five elections or referenda that followed Chávez's presidential
victory, his positions were consistently supported by more than 65 percent of the electorate.41 This level of
2/7/14, 9:32 AM
Page 17 of 29http://lasa-2.univ.pitt.edu/LARR/prot/search/retrieve/?Vol=37&Num=1&Start=41
support enabled him to enact a new constitution in 1999 and then to be reelected in 2000 for a lengthened six-
year term.
Chávez's electoral victory and his political agenda have precipitated a major transformation in civil-military
relations in Venezuela with troubling implications for the future of civilian control of the armed forces. First,
his role as a former coup leader, his vindication of the 1992 coup attempt, and his reliance on active and
retired military officers for administrative functions have significantly increased politicization of the armed
forces. Second, at Chávez's direction, military roles and missions have been substantially reoriented from
national defense to internal security, development, and government administration, all of which are likely to
further politicize the armed forces. Third, the Constitution of 1999 confirms the military's expanded role in
state affairs while dismantling the admittedly problematic institutional mechanisms of civilian control
developed during the Punto Fijo era.
Politicization of the Armed Forces
President Chávez has made his experiences as a military officer and a coup leader integral to his image as a
politician, but his ennobling of military virtues has generated considerable discontent in the armed forces
over his blurring of the boundaries between civilian and military roles. His frequent use of military uniforms
in public ceremonies belies the civilian nature of the post of commander in chief in a democratic regime and
calls into question the source of his authority over the armed forces.42 Moreover, in vindicating the failed
1992 coup attempts, Chávez has validated military deliberation on the legitimacy of civilian regimes and
future rebellions against constituted authority.43 It also raises the question, what are the acceptable
boundaries of military participation in a democratic regime?
Discussion of the role of the armed forces in politics sharpened in the 2000 election campaign, in which
President Chávez sought reelection for a term lengthened to six years under the new Constitution of 1999.
His opponent, Francisco Arias Cárdenas, was a coconspirator in the February 1992 coup attempt who later
participated in democratic politics and was elected governor of the state of Zulia. Arias's decision to run was
motivated by personal disagreements with President Chávez over the direction of "the Bolivarian revolution."
His defection from the government camp surprisingly was supported by the other three "comandantes"
(lieutenant colonels) who had conspired with Chávez and Arias to carry out the February 1992 coup. The
split between President Chávez and the other leaders of the 1992 coups raised the possibility of an internal
division within the military. Arias's unexpected emergence as the main opposition presidential candidate led
to a bitter political debate between the two candidates in which each accused the other of treason and
incompetence in his professional military career. The 2000 presidential elections were also the first in which
armed forces personnel had the right to vote, and they therefore had to choose between two candidates who
were former military officers. Both sought the military vote aggressively. This turn of events led to reports of
factionalization of the armed forces between "Aristas" and "Chavistas," a subject that surfaced repeatedly in
the press during the campaign.44 Chávez's victory in the July 2000 elections squelched these rumors, at least
for now.
President Chávez's administration has also been noted for relying on active-duty and retired military officers
to staff political and bureaucratic positions. Both categories of military officers have occupied up to a third of
the positions in the presidential cabinet, including the Ministerio del Interior y Justicia and the Ministerio de
Infrastructura, and the governorship of the federal district during the transition to the Quinta República.45 As
of June 2001, 176 active-duty military officers held senior ministerial or administrative positions in the
government. Military officers have been appointed as president and vice president of Petróleos de Venezuela
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(PDV), the state oil company, and as chief executive officer of its U.S. subsidiary, CITGO.46 Active-duty
military officers have also served as the president's chief of staff and personal secretary. An active-duty
general headed the state agency charged with building public housing, including new homes for victims of
the 1999 flooding disaster in the state of Vargas, as well as the Oficina del Presupuesto (the budget office).
Chávez has been careful to appoint officers who supported him in the 1992 coups to head the political and
judicial police forces. A number of mid-ranking officers have also been transferred to administrative
functions in traditionally civilian bureaucracies, particularly posts in tax collection and customs. More
controversially, the president encouraged several active-duty military officers to run for office in the 2000
elections on his party's ticket. So far, all these officers have submitted their resignations prior to taking up
political activity.47
This pattern of military involvement in directing state agencies is unusual by Venezuelan standards, although
the participation of retired military officers in politics is common in many democracies. But the high degree
of participation by active-duty military officers in nondefense policy making and implementation has
undermined civilian control and created the potential for increased civil-military conflict. One example was
the conflict among President Chávez's civilian allies in the rump Asamblea Nacional Constituyente (also
known as the Congresillo), the director of the civilian political police (DISIP), and the armed forces over the
redesign of the national intelligence system. Former DISIP chief Eliécer Otaiza (another former military
officer and 1992 coup conspirator) drew up legislation that would have forced the Dirección de Inteligencia
Military to report to a nonmilitary national intelligence agency, the Servicio Nacional de Seguridad, which
was to be made up of personnel of the civilian political police.48 This law was approved by the Congresillo
despite heavy criticism from civilians. In an unusual step, however, President Chávez vetoed the law,
primarily because of opposition within the military.49 This conflict among various retired and active-duty
members of the armed forces over legislation illustrates one type of conflict that can develop when the armed
forces become highly involved in policy making.
One means that Chávez has employed to retain control over the armed forces is using his presidential powers
to promote officers sympathetic to his cause and to expel those suspected of opposing him. Officers who
reached prominent positions under the previous administration, such as Caldera's son-in-law General Rubén
Rojas Pérez, were retired as soon as Chávez assumed the presidency. Even those who maintained political
neutrality during the 1998 electoral process, such as General Noel Martínez Ochoa, commander of Comando
Unificado de la Fuerza Armada Nacional (CUFAN), were retired within the year. Meanwhile, allies of
President Chávez have risen rapidly to positions of authority. For example, General Lucas Rincón Romero is
now Inspector General de la Fuerza Armada, following a stint as President Chávez's chief of staff, a job
reserved for civilian political allies of the president during the Punto Fijo period.50 General Manuel Rosendo,
noted for his speech favoring the Bolivarian revolution in the 5 July Independence Day military parade, was
appointed commander of CUFAN, which enjoys operational control of almost all military assets in
Venezuela.51 Rosendo's predecessor, General Gonzalo García Ordóñez held this position for only six
months.52 Turnover in the highest military positions has been higher than under Punto Fijo democracy, which
was already much criticized for rotating senior officers too quickly.
The politicization of the armed forces (both for and against the new regime) has become increasingly public
in reaction to the new military policies of President Chávez. For example, General Manuel Rosendo stated in
a speech that the military parade demonstrated the armed forces' loyalty to President Chávez. The parade
itself, which added floats highlighting the military's participation in civic action projects to the usual display
of tanks, was perceived by many as signaling that the armed forces backed the president's revolutionary
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project.53 Yet only a month prior to the parade, two military officers had been arrested for stating their
opposition to President Chávez's policies on videotape and television. Others have retired from the armed
forces to protest what they allege is political manipulation of the process of officer promotion.54 Similarly, a
group of retired senior military officers known as the Frente Institucional Militar have repeatedly criticized
the Chávez administration's use of the armed forces to implement social programs.55 Rumors of military
conspiracies have surfaced repeatedly in the press, forcing the government to deny any dissent within the
armed forces.56 These high-profile public statements by military officers for and against the new government
are unprecedented by the standards of the Punto Fijo period. Such commentary reveals the increasing stress
generated within the officer corps by President Chávez's use of the military to support his political and
economic reforms.
Expanding Military Roles and Missions
In the Fifth Republic, the armed forces have become a main executor of government social and political
policy. Since the beginning of his term, President Chávez has argued that the only way to meet the current
national crisis in Venezuela is to take advantage of the human and technical resources provided by the armed
forces.57 Furthermore, President Chávez has explicitly called on the armed forces to join and support his
revolutionary project.58 The proposed reform of the Ley Orgánica of the armed forces, prepared by the
defense ministry, identifies eighteen missions for the armed forces, as compared with six in the existing law,
"Anteproyecto de Ley de las Fuerzas Armadas." The military has already played a prominent role in public
policy through the Plan Bolívar 2000 social program, in disaster relief and internal security following the
floods in the state of Vargas in December 1999, and in the staffing of key positions in the government
bureaucracy.
The Plan Bolívar 2000, one of the first programs announced by President Chávez on taking office, aims
broadly at incorporating the armed forces into domestic political and economic affairs. The plan calls for
refurbishing and constructing infrastructure, providing health care for the poor, combating illiteracy and
unemployment, and distributing food. Initially established as a six-month emergency program that hired
unemployed civilians and placed them under the direction of military officers, the plan now appears to have
become a permanent part of the Chávez administration's policies.59 Under the Plan Bolívar 2000, the armed
forces have used soldiers even to sell basic goods at below-market prices to hold down costs in lower- and
working-class marketplaces. The air force now provides low-cost rural air transport through its Rutas
Sociales, and the navy is aiding the fishing industry through the program Pescar 2000. Some twenty-nine
thousand troops (out of a total force of eighty-five thousand) participated in this program in its first year.60
While these military-led efforts at alleviating poverty and stimulating economic development may provide
significant public benefits, they have come at the expense of civilian participation and leadership in these
areas. Instead, the Chávez administration has starved opposition governors and mayors of resources with
which to address these problems.61 This strategy of underfunding regional governments has continued even
as Venezuela has benefited from a sharp rise in world oil prices that peaked at more than thirty dollars per
barrel, generating a large sum of windfall revenues with which the central government can fund discretionary
spending. Even though the government was legally required to channel a substantial amount of this funding
to state and local governments, it failed to do so (Monaldi Marturet 1999). President Chávez avoided
disbursing windfall profits from the sale of oil that were set aside in a macroeconomic stabilization fund, part
of which was originally destined for the use of regional governments. Instead, military garrisons, as principal
executors of the Plan Bolívar 2000 in each state, have benefited from these revenues and replaced the state
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and municipal governments as the main agents for regional development and the alleviation of poverty.62
Another significant expansion of the military mission occurred following the December 1999 floods that
devastated the coastal state of Vargas and left tens of thousands homeless. In response to this crisis and the
wave of looting that followed, President Chávez deployed regular army troops to provide security and
disaster relief. They acted in cooperation with the police and the Guardia Nacional, the forces that
traditionally have performed internal security missions.63 This type of deployment is not an uncommon
mission for any armed forces, even in well-established democracies. What has been unusual in Venezuela is
the extended length of the operation, which continued for several months following the disaster, and the
accusations of violations of human rights that quickly surfaced in the wake of the military's deployment.64
President Chávez and his administration initially discredited the reports of human rights violations by army
troops, and some elements of the government harassed the journalist who had reported them.65 Further
investigation resulted in the indictment in civilian courts of two low-ranking soldiers for crimes committed
during the Vargas emergency, but the security forces have resisted cooperating with prosecutors.66
The expansion of military roles and missions has generated considerable debate within Venezuela. Retired
military officers have criticized the expansion of the military's role as a threat to the professionalism of the
institution.67 Former Prosecutor General Eduardo Roche Lander reported several cases of corruption
involving irregularities in administering Plan Bolívar monies.68 The current Prosecutor General, Clodosvaldo
Russián, has faced media criticism for delaying publication of an official report confirming large-scale
corruption in the Plan Bolívar.69 Former presidential candidate Francisco Arias Cárdenas has accused the
government of decreasing military readiness due to excessive emphasis on the plan. Other critics have
questioned the diversion of government resources into funding a civic action plan under the auspices of the
military, which has used secrecy regulations to shield from scrutiny its activities on behalf of the plan.70
Although all these critics have valid grounds for their specific concerns, the danger lies not only in expanding
the military's role but in the fact that it is occurring while institutional mechanisms of civilian control are
being dismantled.
Impact of the Constitution of 1999 on the Venezuelan Armed Forces
The new constitution, designed largely by President Chávez, has dismantled the traditional mechanisms of
civilian control of the armed forces developed in the wake of the 1958 transition to democracy. In some
respects, the new constitution represents a significant step forward in democratizing Venezuelan politics, as in
providing soldiers with the right to vote. But it also creates an opening for civil-military conflict in failing to
replace the dysfunctional institutions of the Constitution of 1961 with new avenues for elected officials to
oversee and command the armed forces.
The Asamblea Nacional Constituyente introduced four major changes in the constitutional standing of the
armed forces in 1999, all of which have generated political controversy. Now that active-duty soldiers and
officers have the right to vote, this reform encourages military personnel to participate individually in politics
rather than corporatively as part of an armed institution. More important is Article 328, which redefines the
mission of the armed forces to include cooperating in the maintenance of internal order and participating
actively in national development. Article 330 gives the armed forces the right to perform administrative
police and investigative activities. Although the Venezuelan armed forces legally acquired a development role
in the Ley Orgánica de Seguridad y Defensa in 1976, the Constitution of 1999 gives the mission
constitutional rank. This change makes altering or restricting these missions by future governments much
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more difficult than in the past. Article 331 contains a third critical change in eliminating the right of the
legislature to approve military promotions, leaving this task entirely to the armed forces. The final significant
change enacted in the new constitution was unifying the armed forces into a single structure of command.
President Chávez became the ultimate arbiter of military promotions by virtue of Article 236, which gives
him the right to approve promotions of colonels and generals (and their naval equivalents). Since taking
office, Chávez has moved rapidly both to purge and to enlarge the senior officer corps, now at its largest since
1945 with fifty-five generals and fifteen admirals.71 Furthermore, the proposed Ley Organica of the armed
forces would extend the maximum period of military service from thirty to forty years and would add the new
senior officer rank of lieutenant general.72 These changes would allow Chávez to extend the service of his
current generals and admirals (most of them from his graduating class at the academy) for another ten years.
Taken together, these reforms eliminate two of the underpinnings for civilian control dating from the Punto
Fijo democracy. The first was the constitutional requirement for legislative approval of military promotions
for the ranks of colonel and general. Legislative approval of military promotions overtly affected less than 5
percent of officers in any given year, according to former defense minister García Villasmil. But it had the
important effect of self-censoring ambitious military officers into compliance with the policies of elected
officials. Eliminating this requirement means that the only elected official with any constitutional relationship
to the armed forces is the president. The second underpinning was the decentralization of command authority
within the armed forces, originally brought about by Decree 288 of the 1958 transitional government. During
the Punto Fijo period, each service had administrative independence, which increased the cleavages
crosscutting the military. This arrangement deterred military intervention by increasing the risk that a coup
d'état would fail due to lack of coordination, and it encouraged each service to compete with the others for
resources and attention from elected officials. Without these two mechanisms or any alternatives that could
facilitate civilian control, the Venezuelan armed forces have become substantially more independent of
political oversight.
CONCLUSION
Venezuela survived the coup attempts in 1992 because democratizers had achieved institutionalized civilian
control of the armed forces after 1958. Yet even though these institutions managed to contain military
rebellion, they could not survive the radical transformation in Venezuela's political regime that accompanied
the election of President Hugo Chávez. The Constitution of 1999 provides for personalized control of the
military by the president. President Chávez has the military knowledge and skills that may enable him to
exercise this oversight effectively during his term in office (which could last up to thirteen years).73 The
absence of institutionalized control, however, means that future elected officials will have little or no control
over the activities of the armed forces, nor will they have any mechanism for deterring renewed military
intervention in politics.
Venezuela's political and economic crisis in the 1980s provided an opening for military intervention, which
led to the 1992 coup attempts. This crisis called into question the legitimacy of the democratic regime, at
least for a sizable minority of military officers. It also undermined significant institutions for appeasing the
officer corps, particularly regarding salaries and benefits. Simultaneously, the absence of military intervention
for three decades and the willful inattention of senior military and civilian officials to discontent among
junior officers allowed conspiracies to develop unchecked.
Only the divide and conquer institutions of civilian control developed during the 1958 transition to
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democracy checked the success of the 1992 coup attempts. The difficulty of coordinating military rebellion
among officers in different services and a high degree of cohesion among senior civilian and military officials
worked against a successful coup. Once the immediate crisis had passed, these institutions also allowed
President Caldera to rebuild civilian authority over the armed forces. This authority persisted despite
worsening economic conditions between 1994 and 1999.
Venezuelans missed a substantial opportunity to reform civil-military relations in the wake of the failed coups
of 1992. Although institutionalized civilian strategies of divide and conquer and appeasement effectively
deterred military intervention, they did not enable elected officials to carry out the level of oversight
necessary for strong civilian control of the armed forces. Rather than develop a civilian ministry of defense
and effective legislative oversight committees, civilians chose to retain the weak institutions of civilian
control inherited from the 1958 transition to democracy. These institutions were sufficient to deter renewed
military intervention but did not address the fundamental sources of military discontent. This situation laid
the groundwork for military support of the reforms carried out during the first year of President Chávez's
administration.
The Chávez administration has transformed Venezuelan civil-military relations, although not necessarily for
the better. Some reforms were long overdue, such as the military vote, yet the overall impact of these
measures has been to dismantle the institutions of civilian control. Even the recent appointment of a civilian,
José Vicente Rangel, as defense minister has not strengthened civilian authority. Negative reactions forced
President Chávez to remove Rangel from the direct chain of command and appoint instead Inspector General
Luis Amaya as senior military officer directly subordinate to the president. Tellingly, the office of the new
civilian defense minister is not located at the ministry but at the former headquarters of the air force. This
outcome leaves elected officials with little choice but to depend on personal relationships to manage civil-
military affairs. Rather than use the opportunity for reform provided by the 1999 Asamblea Nacional
Constituyente, the Chávez administration has chosen to insulate the armed forces constitutionally from
civilian control. This approach maximizes the president's personal authority over the military. As the only
elected official with any direct constitutional relationship to the military, President Chávez occupies an
unequaled position of political power vis-à-vis opposition parties and civil society. Yet he is in a weak
institutional position in relation to the the armed forces. While this pattern of military reforms is an
understandable reaction to the dysfunctional nature of the civil-military institutions operating from 1958 to
1999, it also represents a move away from democratic civilian control.
As a former military officer, President Chávez may have the ability to exercise personal authority over the
armed forces successfully. But the reorientation of security forces toward internal roles and missions has
traditionally been a leading indicator of civil-military conflict and authoritarian rule in many countries
(Trinkunas 1999, 8-12). Moreover, the current level of military participation in economic development and
internal security is likely to expose the armed forces to substantial corruption. Military participation in
staffing traditionally civilian bureaucracies and running for political office is likely to increase partisanship
within the officer corps. Similarly, military discontent with the regime is likely to develop as the interference
of the Chávez administration in military promotions and assignments increases, primarily through the rapid
turnover in senior officers. President Chávez may have the skills to manage this level of military
politicization and discontent, but it seems unlikely that any of his elected successors will be able to follow
suit. This trend in civil-military relations bodes ill for future regime stability and democracy in Venezuela.
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